THE

-

POLITICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS
CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY.

OF

It is an interesting coincidence that the two treaties which
mark a turning point in the .domestic and foreign policy of
the United States should both have been negotiated in the
French capital and should both be known as Treaties of
Paris. Although the territory acquired by the treaty of .1899
cannot compare, either in area or value, with the acquisition
of 18o3, its probable influence on the institutional life and
public policy of the country entitles it to a position of almost
equal significance.
The ratification of both treaties was followed by protracted constitutional discussions, first as to power of the
United States government to acquire territory and then as to
the Xmitations on congressional action in dealing with the
inhabitants. The controversies of 1803 were not set at rest
until the decision of the highest Federal tribunal settled the
disputed questions. The treatment of the territory acquired
by the treaty of 1899 has aroused differences of opinion no
less marked which have not been reconciled by the
opinions of the Supreme Court in the insular cases. This
is due, in part, to the unprecedented division of opinion
amongst the justices, but mainly to the failure of the decisions to answer clearly and definitely some of the most important constitutional questions involved in the controversy.
American Insurance Co. v. Canter,' set at rest all doubt as
to the constitutional power of the United States to acquire
territory-a power which rests upon no specific constitutional provision but is incident, to and inherent in the existence of the United States as a sovereign nation. The conditions under which such territory may be held, the relation
of the constitutional privileges, requirements and limitations
to the inhabitants, and the power of Congress in dealing with
the population are all questions to which the Supreme Court
had given no definite answer, owing to the fact that the
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specific points at issue in the recent cases had never before
been presented for adjudication. It is true that in a number
of opinions incidental questions were adjudicated, which
furnish a background of precedent, but even these precedents
are valuable as an indication of the attitude of the court
rather than final adjudications of the questions involved.
In addition to these constitutional questions, some of
which were passed upon in the insular cases, the ratification
of the treaty of Paris brought up a number of legal questions
-international and domestic-presenting peculiar difficulties. The overthrow of the Spanish government by the invading army of the United States, placed the island in possession
of the military authorities. In the exercise of the right
accorded by international law to every belligerent, a provisional government was established for the purpose of
maintaining social order and securing respect for person and
property.
In administering civil affairs, as an obligation incident to belligerent occupation, the power of the military commanders is free from constitutional limitations
on executive, legislative and judicial power. During this
period the territory does not become part of the United
States. In Fleming v. Page,2 the Supreme Court of the
United States, speaking of the status of Tampico during its
belligerent occupation by United States troops said: "The
boundaries of the United States as they existed when war
was declared against Mexico were not extended by the conquest; nor could they be regulated by the varying incidents
of war and be enlarged or diminished as the armies on either
side advanced or retreated. They remained unchanged and
every place which was out of the limits of the United States
as previously established by the political authorities of the
government, was still foreign." As a matter of public policy,
military governments thus established have usually allowed
the domestic institutions of the occupied or conquered country to remain untouched, especially when not in flagrant conflict with the institutions and political standards of the
conquering country. In fact the "Instructions for the Gov2 9 Howard, 66.
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ernment of Armies of the United States in the Field," 3 provide that "all civil and penal law shall continue to take its
usual course in the enemy's places and territories under
martial law, unless interrupted or stopped by order of the
occupying military power; but all the functions of the hostile
government-legislative, executive or administrativewhether of a general, provincial or local character, cease
tinder martial law, or continue only with the sanction, or if
deemed necessary, the participation of the occupier or
invader."
The moment the invaded territory ceases to be the theatre
of military operations the authority of the military government becomes subject to important limitations. The complete dependence of individual rights on the will of the military commander ceases, and his acts become subject to certain rules of law which the courts have not hesitated to
enforce. Of these the most important is the rule of "immediate exigency" or "necessity.", When, during the Reconstruction Period, the military governors attempted to set
aside judicial decrees the Supreme Court held that "it is an
unbending rule of law, that the exercise of military power
where the rights of the citizens are concerned shall never be
'' 4
pushed beyond what the exigency requires.
The ratification of the treaty of Paris on the eleventh of
April, 1899, and the formal transfer of sovereignty did not
affect the existence of the military government, although it
served still further to limit its powers. It is evident that
the change of dominion alone contributed nothing towards
the establishment of a new government to replace the old.
The same principle of overruling necessity which explains the
necessity for the establishment of military government justifies its continued existence until replaced by some form of

civil rule. On this point there has been complete harmony of
practice and opinion in the executive, legislative and judicial
branches of the government. Military government was continued over New Mexico and California for a considerable
period after the treaty of peace with Mexico. President Polk,
'General Order Ioo, A. G. 0. 1863.
'Raymond v. Thomas,-9 U. S. 712.
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in his message of December 5, 1848, justified this policy in the
following terms: "The only government which remained was
that established by the military authority during the war.
Regarding this to be a de facto government, and that by the
personal consent of the inhabitants it might be continued
temporarily, they were advised to conform and submit to it
for the short intervening period before Congress would again
assemble and could legislate upon the subject." The first
clear judicial adjudication of this question was made by the
5
Supreme Court of the United States in Cross v. Harrison.
The question at issue was the validity of certain.customs
duties collected on goods coming into California, and involved, incidentally, the authority of the military governor
to impose such duties after the ratification of the treaty of
peace. Referring to the continued existence of the military
government after the exchange of ratifications the Court
said: "The President might have dissolved it by withdrawing the army and navy officers who administered it, but he
did not do so. Congress could have put an end to it, but that
was not done. The right inference from the inaction of
both is that it was meant to be continued until it had been
legislatively changed. No presumption of a contrary intention can be made. Whatever may have been the causes of
delay, it must be presumed that the delay was consistent with
the true policy of the government; and the more so, as it -was
continued until the people of the territory met in convention to form a state government, which was subsequently
recognized by Congress under its power to admit new states
into the Union."
While its existence may thus be continued, the status of
the military government undergoes some change through
the ratification of the treaty of peace. Prior to this time a
state of war constructively exists and the military government is merely a substitute for the displaced authorities.
After the ratification of the treaty, the military government
representsthe new sovereignty,6 and its action can no longer
S16 Howard, 164.
'This distinction has been clearly set forth in the valuable compilation
of the reports of the law officer of the War Department, Charles E.
Magoon, Esq.
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rest upon military exigency. It becomes a provisional civil
authority, entrusted with the task of maintaining order, protecting the public health and promoting the administration
of the internal affairs of the country. The substitution of the
civil for the military code is no longer a matter of choice.
The action of the military authorities must conform to the
fundamental principles of free government and respect for
individual rights, the summary methods of martial rule
being no longer permissible. In ex parte Milligan,7 the distinction between the two kinds of military jurisdiction was
clearly pointed out. The case involved the validity of a conviction by a military court held in the state of Indiana during the civil war. "If, in foreign invasion or civil war, the
courts are actually closed and it is impossible to administer
criminal justice according to law, then on'the theatre of active military operations, where war really prevails, there is a
necessity to furnish a substitute for the civil authority thus
overthrown to preserve the safety of the army and society,
and as no power is left but the military, it is allowed to
govern by martial rule until the laws can have their free
course. As necessity creates the rule, so it limits its duration; for if this government is continued after the courts are
reinstated, it is a gross usurpation of power. Martial rule
can never exist where the courts are open and in the proper
and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction. It is also
confined to the locality of actual war."
In one of the recent insular cases-Dooley v. United
States,S-the Supreme Court laid down a principle which
places a further limitation on the power of the military
authority as soon as the treaty of peace is ratified. Commenting on the customs dues imposed on articles coming into
Porto Rico from the United States after the eleventh of
April, 1899, the Court says: "The spirit as well as the letter
of the tariff laws admits of duties being levied by a military
commander only upon importations from foreign countries;
and while his power is necessarily despotic, this must be understood rather in an administrative thin in a legislative
sense. 'While in legislating for a conquered country he may
'4 Wallace,
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disregard the laws of that country, he is not wholly above the
laws

of his own.

.

.

. His power

to administer

would be absolute, but his power to legislate would not be
without certain restrictions-in other words, they would not
extend beyond the necessities of the case." While the expressions used by the Court are somewhat vague, they were
intended undoubtedly to convey the meaning that the power
of the military commander is unlimited in prescribing administrative rules to meet immediate exigencies or in adapting
native institutions to American standards, but in the determination of the public policy of the territory under-military
rule, no step contrary to the general legislative policy of the
United States can be taken.
Before leaving this phase of the subject it may be well
to point out the peculiar situation in the Philippine Islands,
due to the fact that coincident with the change of sovereignty
the United States government had to deal with an insurrectionary movement which threatened to postpone, for an indefinite period, the introduction of civil rule. The continuance of the armed conflict, furthermore, prevented the treaty
of peace from having its full effect 'on the personal. rights
and immunities of the inhabitants. But the fact that certain districts not only welcomed American rule but were
co-operating with the authorities in improving conditions in
the islands, made the government feel inclined to extend to
such districts the full benefits of civil rule. To effect this
purpose without seriously interfering with the authority of
the military .officers in the disturbed provinces required the
formulation of a new theory of military rule, or at least a
new series of distinctions as to the elements which compose
it. The Secretary of War proved himself fully equal to the
task and in his effort was seconded by Congress and the
President.
The view taken by the Secretary of War was that the
military power vested in the President as commander-inchief of the military and naval forces of the United States
embraces executive, legislative and judicial functions. Not
only ig a separation of these functions possible but they may
each be xercised by a different group of officials. It is also
a well settled principle that this military power of the Presi-
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dent may be exercised through civil agents as well as by
military officers. As stated by the Secretary of War in his
report for i9OI: "The military power when exercised in a
territory under military occupation includes executive, judicial and legislative authority. It not infrequently happens
that in a single order of a military commander can be found
the exercise of all three of these different powers-the exercise of the legislative power by provisions prescribing a rule
of action, of judicial power by determinations of right, and
of executive power by the enforcement of the rules prescribed
and the rights determined."
This division of authority paved the way for the appointment of the Philippine Commission. which was vested with
"that part of the military power of the -resident in the
Philippines which is legislative in its character." 9 The
executive authority in civil affairs was retained by
the military governor in order to assure the ready and
prompt action which the exceptional situation demanded.
Judicial power was vested in such courts as the Commission,
in the exercise of its legislative power, might create. Although nominally exercising legislative powers, the Commission enjoyed important executive functions. Thus,
under the instructions issued by the President August 7,
19oo,10 the Commission was given power "to appoint to office
such officers under the judicial, educational and civil-service
systems and in the municipal and departmental governments
as shall be provided for."
It was felt by the administration that the injection of the
civil element into the military government would soften the
rigors of the latter and would tend to bring the administration of the affairs of the islands into closer harmony with
American standards of liberty. While this end was undoubtedly attained, the peculiar division of power gave rise
to friction between the Commission and the military authorities, which threatened to reduce considerably the usefulness
of the former. In order to pave the way for the complete
establishment of civil government, the Spooner amendment
to the army appropriation bill-was passed (March 2, 1901),
:Report, Secretary of War (19oo), p. 25.
Report of Secretary of War (igoo).
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which provides that "all military, civil and judicial powers
necessary to govern the Philippine Islands
shall,
until otherwise provided by Congress, be vested in such person and persons and shall be exercised in such manner as the
President of the United States shall direct for the establishment of civil government and for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of said islands in-the free enjoyment of
their liberty, property and religion." This amendment made
it possible for the President to make such adjustments between the civil and military authorities as the exigencies of
the situation -required. In the districts completely .pacified
the civil authority was made supreme; wherever disturbafices
were still threatened the military government remained in
undisturbed control. The final step in the establishment of
civil government was made by the Philippine Civil Government Act of July I, 1902. Thus, owing to the insurrectionary
movement, the ratification of the treaty of peace did not have
quite the same legal effects in the Philippines as in Porto
Rico. The unrestricted authority of the military commander
was continued for a much longer period.
It remains now to consider the effect of the treaty of Paris
on the laws and institutions of the ceded territory and on the
political rights and civil status of its inhabitants. The
clauses ceding Porto Rico and the Philippines transferred to
the United States complete political power over the islhads
together with all the property and interests possessed therein
by Spain."
In the course of the negotiations at Paris, the Spanish
Commissioners insisted that the United States assume the
indebtedness contracted by Spain in the interest and for the
benefit of the ceded territory. To this the American representatives refused to accede. Under the rules of international
law such obligation does not pass unless specifically so provided in the treaty of cession. The situation with reference
to the indebtedness of municipalities and other local subdivisions is somewhat different. They are corporations with
obligations of a quasi-private nature which remain unaffected
by the .change of sovereignty. In fact it becomes the duty
' Cf. losephs v. U. S. Court of Claims (1865).

I Court of Claims,
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of the new sovereign to hold the local governments to a strict
observance of their contractual obligations.
In ordinary circumstances the effects of a transfer of territory upon local laws and upon the political and civil rights of
the inhabitants are dependent upon two circumstanceg; first,
the general principles of international law, and secondly,
the specific provisions of the treaty of cession. Under our
system of government a thirf factor must be added, viz: the
provisions of the Constitution. It is a well-settled principle
of law that the change of sovereignty does not affect those
_portions of the local law that regulate the personal and property relations of the inhabitants inter se. All laws of a political or administrative character, however, which are not in
harmony with the institutions of the new s9vereignty are
abrogated. They lose their force and effect by the fact of
transfer of sovereignty and require no positive action on the
part of the new government. The theory upon which this
principle rests is that sudden changes in the private law
-would work great injustice to innocent parties and would

tend to complicate the problem of government by arousing
the antagonism of the inhabitants of the ceded territory.

On the other hand the new sovereign cannot permit the continued existence of institutions which are hopelessly at variance with the genius and character of its political system.
To do this requires affirmative action indicating an evident
intent to preserve the political institutions of the displaced
sovereignty.
The rules of law governing the question were clearly presented in the Chicago R. I. & P. R'y Co. v. McGlinn.'2 "It
is a general rule of public law, recognized and acted upon by
the United States, that whenever political jurisdiction and
legislative power over any territory are transferred from one
nation or sovereign to anothef, the municipal laws of the
country, that is, laws which are intended for the protection
of private rights, continue in force until abrogated or
changed by the new government or sovereign. By the cession, public property passes from one government to the other.
but private property remains as before, and with it those
32
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municipal laws which are designed to secure its peaceful use
and enjoyment. As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances,
and regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions and constitution of the new government are at once
displaced. Thus, upon a cession of political jurisdiction and
legislative power-and the latter is involved in the formerto the United States, the laws of the country in support of
dn established religion, or abridging, the freedom of the
press, or authorizing cruel and unusual punishments, and
the like, would at once cease to be of obligatory force without any declaration to that effect; and the laws of the country
on other subjects would necessarily be superseded by 'existing laws of the new government upon the same matters!'
While the general principle involved is perfectly clear, its
application, at times, is extremely difficult. But a short time
ago the Supreme Court of Porto Rico was called upon to
determine whether the Spanish Press Law of November I I,
1886, in force in Porto Rico was abrogated by reason of the
change of sovereignty. In this case the Court (per. Justice
McLeary), held that the first amendment to the Constitution
prohibiting Congress from making any law abridging the
freedom of the press was in force in Porto Rico. In deciding
the point at issue it was hardly necessary for the Court to
take this advanced position. All the requirements of the
situation would have been met if the Court had held closely
to the principle laid down in R. R. Co. v. McGlinn, viz: that
the law in question was in direct antagonism with one of the
fundamental principles of American liberty-the freedom of
the press.
From what has been said it must not be inferred that. the
political laws of the displaced sovereignty cannot be continued in force. To effect this purpose, however, an express
declaration by the new sovereignty is necessary. Thus, at
the time of the occupation of Porto Rico the laws relating
to local governinent were continued in force by the military
governor and in the Organic Act of April 12, 19oo, it was

provided that "the laws and ordinances of Porto Rico now
in f6rce shall continue in full force and effect, except as
altered, amended or modified hereinafter, or as altered or
modified by military orders and decrees in force when this
act shall take effect."

476

THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS, ETC.

Were no constitutional questions involved, the political
and civil status of the inhabitants of newly acquired territory
would be solved without difficulty. The general rule of
international law is that a transfer of territory implies a
transfer of allegiance unless the treaty of cession c6ntains
some provision to the contrary. In the treaty with Spain

the option of retaining Spanish nationality was limited to
Spanish subjects, natives of fhe mother country. The civil
rights and political status of the native-born inhabitants of
Porto Rico and the Philippines were left to the subsequent
determination of Congress. The content of this reserved
power, in fact its constitutionality, depends upon the legal
effects of a treaty of cession. If newly acquired territory is
thereby made part of the United States within the meaning
of the Constitution, the political status, and to a very large
extent the civil rights, of the inhabitants are determined by
the Constitution. The questions here involved we must reserve for subsequent treatment.
The rules of international law with reference to the property rights of inhabitants of ceded territory are clear and,
definite and have been consistently adhered to by the Supreme Court. In United States v. Percheman,1 3 Chief
Justice Marshall in interpreting the eighth article of the
treaty of 1819 with Spain, held that even in the absence of
a treaty stipulation the private property of inhabitants of the
ceded territory would be fully protected. "The people
change their allegiance

.

.

.

but their relations to each

other, and their rights of property, remain undisturbed."
L. S. Rowe.
University of Pennsylvania.
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